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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F . W I L L I A M McGINN I I , 
Plaintiff-R espondent, 
U T A H P O W E R & L I G H T 
COMPANY, a Maine corporation 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13619 
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff when the mast of a sailboat he and four 
others were carrying into Bear Lake came in contact 
with one of defendant's electric power lines resulting in 
substantial burns and other injuries to plaintiff. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
After a five day jury trial, and upon special ver-
dict, the jury found that both the plaintiff and de-
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fendant were negligent but the plaintiff's negligence 
was 60 percent responsible for the accident whereas the 
defendant contributed 40 percent to the accident. The 
lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action 
and subsequently granted plaintiff's motion for new 
trial on alternative grounds. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the order granting a 
new trial and reinstatement of the judgment of no 
cause of action. 
Plaintiff, (and cross-appellant), seeks first that the 
trial court's order granting a new trial be affirmed and, 
in the alternative, that this court grant a new trial on 
the additional grounds raised by way of cross-appeal. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On July 23, 1972, F . William McGinn I I was 
electrocuted and burned while carrying a sailboat across 
an open beach with friends on the north shore of 
Bear Lake in Bear Lake County, Idaho. The unmarked 
beach across which Mr. McGinn and his friends were 
carrying the boat was owned by Utah Power and Light 
Company. To its immediate north is a county road 
which runs along the north shore past a Utah Power 
and Light pumping station called Camp Lifton and an 
Idaho State Park. 
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The beach where the accident occurred west of the 
Camp Lifton pumping station has other characteristics 
which make it a desirable recreation area, despite the 
presence of the three power lines described at length by 
defendant-appellant in its brief. The water is shallow 
(R. 538), the beach itself is composed of gently rolling 
sand dunes covered with annual grass (R. 539), and 
it is generally a "nice family area," "a particularly ap-
pealing area for young families with young children." 
(R. 538-539). There were no signs or fencing or any 
other form of warning indicating high tension wires or 
indicating no trespassing (R. 542). The beach has been 
regularly used for recreation for years, particularly on 
J u l y 4th and 24th (R. 178). Based on the evidence the 
court found as a matter of law that plaintiff was not a 
trespasser at the time and place of the accident (R. 
815). 
Although the members of the par ty were aware of 
the 230,000 volt line on the north side of the road, they 
were not aware of the smaller 46,000 volt line where the 
accident occurred (R. 626, 651, 640). When the mast 
of the boat struck the power line Mr. McGinn was 
shocked, he fell to the ground stunned with no pulse 
or breathing (R. 588, 589). H e immediately caught 
fire (R. 638). F r o m the burns which he received, 
both from the power lines and from the fire, Mr. Mc-
Ginn suffered burns over thirty percent of his body 
surface (R. 484). H e had a serious electrical burn on 
the right flank and another on the left foot. H i s chest, 
right arm, groin and both legs were covered with second 
and third degree burns. Following all treatment Mr . 
3 
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McGinn, characterized by the surgeon who treated him 
as being an exceptionally successful case (R. 523), 
lost four toes, suffered considerable scarring (R. 521) 
and has a substantial surface of his body covered with 
skin grafts which will always be slow in healing, highly 
sensitive to extreme temperatures, susceptible to 
trauma which will require new skin grafts, and other-
wise provide physical limitations for plaintiff for the 
rest of his life (R. 591-594). In addition, plaintiff will 
be susceptible to thrombophlebitis (R. 501) and cata-
racts (R. 505). In addition to his lost wages of $4,-
797.37 (Ex. I I P , 72P) plaintiff, Mr. McGinn, was 
forced to give up his planned career in the National 
Guard with the resulting loss of future income of 
somewhere between $40,172.26 to $88,487.28 (Ex. 73P, 
74P). 
The focus of this appeal is not the merits of the 
case but rather the procedures by which the case was 
submitted to the jury and subsequently a new trial was 
granted. Therefore, although a brief summary of facts 
of the case is given as a supplement to those facts pre-
sented in appellant's brief, a greater emphasis should 
be placed upon the precedural aspects of the case. 
As pointed out by Appellant this case was tried 
under the Idaho Comparative Negligence Statute. 
However, of course, it was tried under Utah procedural 
law. The trial judge ruled that no instructions would 
be given to the jury concerning the effect of their de-
cision on percentage of negligence and further, the 
court prohibited any argument or mention of percent-
ages in closing argument (R. 817). 
4 
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The jury returned a verdict finding defendant, 
Utah Power and Light Company, forty percent negli-
gent and plaintiff, F . William McGinn I I , sixty per-
cent negligent. The jury also assessed $150,000.00 gen-
eral damages and $18,150.00 special damages. Follow-
ing entry of judgment plaintiff filed a motion for a 
judgment not withstanding the verdict or in the alterna-
tive for a new trial. 
The motion for a new trial was based upon de-
fects in the issuance of special interrogatories and errors 
of law committed in the judge's direction on argument 
before the jury. In support of that motion plaintiff 
filed an extensive brief and, in addition, filed affidavits 
of five jurors indicating there was substantial confusion 
concerning the meaning and effect of the special inter-
rogatories which confusion resulted in significant error 
by the jury. Trial Judge Marcellus K. Snow granted 
the Motion for a New Trial on two alternative grounds. 
The first ground was that the jury should have been 
advised of the results of their percentage findings 
through appropriate instructions and argument of 
counsel. The alternative ground which the court found 
to be a sufficient independent reason for granting a 
new trial was that the jurors were not sufficiently in-
structed as to the relationship, or lack of relationship, 
between the percentage findings and damages regard-
less of the instruction received as to the legal meaning 
of the percentages. The judge indicated in the ruling 
that the affidavits of jurors had no substantial affect 
upon the order granting a new trial. I t is from this 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order granting a new trial that defendant appealed and 
it is in light of the propriety of that order that the 
appeal should be judged. 
I N T R O D U C T O R Y S T A T E M E N T 
As the Court is perhaps aware, the instant case was 
the first case ever tried in the State of Utah involving 
an application of comparative negligence, with the ex-
ception, of course, of numerous F E L A cases which have 
been processed through the courts of this State and 
which involve a concept of so-called "complete compar-
ative negligence". During the course of the trial sev-
eral issues arose which were issues of first impression in 
this State. Only one of those was the issue of "blind-
folding" the jury which is discussed extensively in the 
Appellant's Brief and which will be discussed in Point 
I hereinafter. Other issues, equally critical, and before 
this Court either by way of the appeal, or the cross 
appeal, include instructions to be given to the jury re-
garding the percentage findings and damages as well 
as the sphere of permissible argument on the percent-
ages. 
I t is the position of plaintiff that this Court should 
resolve all of these issues of first impression and, after 
resolving the same, should remand the case for a new 
trial in accordance with the ruling of the trial court, 
6 
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with the guidance of this Court on the various issues. 
A dismissal of this case, by this Court, would result in 
substantial prejudice to the plaintiff whose principle 
dilemma is that his case happened to be the first com-
parative negligence case tried in this jurisdiction. 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R I N 
G R A N T I N G P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION F O R 
N E W T R I A L . 
We preface this discussion by noting that the 
granting or denying of a new trial is essentially a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Lehi Ir-
rigation Co. v. Steven Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 Pac. 867 
(1886): 
Motions for new trial are always addressed to 
the sound discretion of the court, and whether 
graned or denied, the discretion of the trial court 
will be presumed to have been properly exercised 
unless the contrary may be made clearly to ap-
pear .(4 Utah 327 at 329, 9 Pac. 867 at 869). 
The Appellant seems to have forgotten, in its Brief, 
that the Motion and Order for new trial were in the 
alternative. Appellant would lead this Court to believe 
that the only issue presented and resolved was whether 
or not the jury should be "blindfolded". To the con-
trary, the Motion for New Trial itself, in addition to 
other grounds, was framed in the alternative as follows: 
7 
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There was error of law committed by the trial 
court in failing to instruct the jury as to the con-
sequences of their special verdict findings and, in 
the alternative, in failing to submit special inter-
rogatories in such a fashion as to not mislead the 
jury. (R. 45, Emphasis added). 
Likewise, in argument before the trial court on the 
Motion for New Trial, following argument on the 
"blindfolding" issue, the alternative ground for new 
trial was argued whereby plaintiff sought more specific 
instructions on the relationship between the percentages 
and the damages such as those given in Wisconsin (see 
R. 930), and also seeking more liberality in terms of 
argument. (R. 931). In concluding argument on this 
point counsel made it clear that the request for new 
trial was in the alternative: 
. . . grant a new trial either on the theory that 
we tell them, or if we don't tell them, give them 
more instruction so that we can at least eliminate 
some of these problems that we have discussed. 
The order of the trial court, granting the new trial, 
was likewise phrased in the alternative. The court first 
found that a new trial should be granted on the ground 
that: 
In comparative negligence cases the jury should 
be advised of the results of their percentage find-
ings through appropriate instructions and argu-
ment of counsel. (Para 3 at R. 16) 
The Court continued: 
4. Alternatively, and in all events, the Court is 
of the opinion that substantial justice has not 
8 
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been done in the present case. The jurors were 
not sufficiently instructed as to the relationship, 
or lack of relationship, between the percentage 
findings and the damages. Therefore, even if the 
jury is not told the legal meaning of the percent-
ages, it should be more specifically instructed on 
how to answer the interrogatiories. The jury 
should be advised and instructed specifically that 
there is no relationship between the damage 
answer and the percentages. (R. 16) 
Although Appellant has argued at length about the 
"blindfolding question", it has not addressed itself what-
soever to the alternative holding of the trial court as 
set forth above regarding appropriate instructions. 
In this point, we will discuss both grounds for the 
new trial and in the remaining points of the brief we 
shall discuss the points on cross-appeal. 
A. The jury should be advised of the effect of its 
percentage findings. 
An issue presented by the appeal, among others, is 
whether in instructing the jury and allowing argument 
to the jury, the trial court should either inform them or 
allow counsel to inform them that a finding of the 
plaintiff's negligence being greater than that of the 
defendant will defeat recovery by the plaintiff. 
I t is important that the Court, in grappling with 
the problem, be fully aware that the question is entirely 
open. That is, this matter is not controlled by the Idaho 
case law nor is it necessarily resolved by reference to 
another State such as Wisconsin. The question pre-
9 
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sented is a philosophical one, touching rather funda-
mental concepts, which ought properly to be resolved 
by each State in accordance with its own traditions and 
philosophy. 
The law of Utah rather than the law of Idaho is 
controlling on matters regarding the submission of the 
case to the jury. 
Perhaps the most fundamental error committed by 
the Power Company in its Brief is the assumption that 
Idaho law, rather than Utah law, is controlling on the 
question of whether or not the jury should be blind-
folded.1 Appellant simply ignores the fundamental 
choice of law question inherent in this matter — in con-
sidering how the jury is to be instructed does the law 
of the forum (Utah) or the law of the lex loci (Idaho) 
apply? 
The law is settled beyond reasonable argument that 
such a question should be governed by the law of Utah 
rather than that of the law of Idaho.2 We start with 
the general proposition that the procedural laws of the 
forum are to apply rather than those of the place of 
the tort. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 245, 166 P.2d 
205 (1946). I t is also quite clear that the method of 
submission to the jury and the form of verdict are "pro-
cedural" rather than substantive in this context. See, 
for example, Section 127, American Law Institute, Re-
1 See, for example, the assertion at page 16 of Appellants Brief 
to the effect that "Holland v. Petersen, the Idaho Comparative 
Negligence Case . . . is controlling in this case." 
2 This matter was briefed in the lower court — see R 63, 64. 
10 
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statement of the Law of Conflict of Laws 2nd (1971) 
which states tha t : 
The local law of the forum governs rules of 
pleading and the conduct of proceedings in 
Court. 
I n a comment to that general proposition, there is an 
elaboration stating that : 
The local law of the forum governs, among 
other things, the following matters: . . . the form 
of verdict and judgment . 
Analogously, the Federal Courts have held in diversity 
cases that State law regarding the relative function of 
judge and j u r y should not be applied, but that the Fed-
eral law on that subject is controlling as it is "pro-
cedural". F o r example, in Mississippi Power <§ Light 
Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir. 1934), 
the Court observed: 
Section 511 of Mississippi Code of 1930 pro-
vides that the negligence of the person injured 
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall 
be diminished by the j u r y in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to him. Sec-
tion 512 is that all questions of negligence and 
contributory negligence shall be for the j u r y to 
determine. W e agree with appellant's conten-
tion that the latter section is not binding in a 
federal court, but deals with the functions of 
judge and j u r y as to which federal courts have 
their own organization and as to which state law 
is without effect. 
Therefore, while Idaho's substantive law applies 
in this case, (i.e. the law of comparative negligence), 
11 
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Utah is free to apply its own procedural law and to 
decide for itself the nature of the relationship between 
judge and jury. The assumption of the Power Com-
pany that Idaho law is "controlling" is palpably 
erroneous. 
T H E C O N T R O V E R S E Y 
The basic question — "should the jury be blind-
folded?" is far more simply stated than resolved. There 
is respectable and indeed plethoric authority on this 
subject, both case and commentary, pro and con.3 To 
summarize, analyze, quote from and argue those volumes 
would consume far more pages than this Court's rules 
or time would allow, and thus we would rather analyze 
a more specific question — "should the jury be blind-
folded in Utah?" 
We start with the proposition that, although Rule 
49, Utah Rules of Court Procedure, no doubt allows 
the use of special verdicts, the tradition in this State 
has been essentially a tradition of general verdicts. 
3 See, e.g. Badger v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 414 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1969); Wilson v. Benton, 476 S.W.2d 214 (Ark. 1972); 
Chitwood v. Myers, 443 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1969); Thode, Com-
parative Negligence Contribution Among Tort-Feasors and the 
Effect of a Release — A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 
1973 Utah L. Rev. 406; Fine, Does the Trend in Our Substan-
tive Law Dictate an Expanded Use of the Special Verdict?, 37 
Albany L. Rev. 229 (1973); Flynn, Comparative Negligence: 
the Debate, Trial 219 (May/June 1972); Guinn, The Jury Sys-
tem and Special Verdicts, 2 St. Mary's L.J. 175 (1970); Denton, 
Informing a Jury of the Legal Effect of its Answer, 2 St. Mary's 
L.J. 1 (1970); Green, The Submission of Special Verdicts in 
Negligence Cases — A Critique of the Bug Bite Case, XVII 
University of Miami L. Rev. 469 (1963); Bertelsman, Special 
Verdicts and Interrogatories, 30 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 208 (1961). 
12 
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This Court has placed its imprimatur on that tradition. 
In Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 164, 308 P . 2d 264, 
267 (1957) the Court noted: 
As heretofore observed, great care should be 
taken to submit questions to the jury so that they 
are as clear as possible. When a general verdict 
will best settle the issues, it should be used. When 
specific issues cannot be reached by a general ver-
dict, the trial court should take advantage of 
special verdicts or special interrogatories. 
And in Barton v. Jensen, 19 Utah 2d 196, 199, 429 P . 
2d 44, 46 (1967) four of the Justices adopted the fol-
lowing statement: 
A majority of the members of the Court are of 
the opinion that in cases such as this, which con-
sist of simple negligence, where only two parties 
are involved, it would be better practice to sub-
mit the case to the jury upon a general verdict. 
I t appears that the best efforts of trial judges 
to make interrogatories simple, concise and un-
derstandable still result in juries misunderstand-
ing what is intended. 
Justice Ellett, concurring in result, stated a preference 
for special verdicts. 
Likewise in Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, although there are provisions for the special 
verdicts (R 49 (a)) and general verdicts accompanied 
by answers to interrogatories (R 49 (b)) , these matters 
are left to the trial court's discretion and indeed, Rule 
49(b) suggests that the jury should be advised as to 
what it is doing and the significance of its answers: 
13 
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The Court shall give such explanation or in-
struction as may be necessary to enable the jury 
both to make answers to the interrogatories and 
to render a general verdict, and the court shall 
direct the jury both to make written answers and 
to render a general verdict. 
See also JIFU Section 1.11 which shows a typical use 
of special verdict or interrogatories accompanied with 
what is tantamount to general verdict. 
We suggest that it has been the practice in the 
State of Utah that the form and nature of interroga-
tories and verdicts submitted to a jury have been large-
ly left to the discretion of the trial court depending 
upon the nature of the case involved. Certainly, it is 
the law generally that the form of submission to the 
jury is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. See, for example; 5 A Moore's Federal 
Practice, § 49.03 [1] wherein the author observes: 
Under Rule 49 (a) the court has complete dis-
cretion as to whether a special or general verdict 
is to be returned. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus the method of submission has typically been con-
trolled by the philosophy and the discretion of the trial 
judge, the nature of the case (i.e. in a complex, multi-
party case the need for special interrogatories is per-
haps more evident), and other similar factors. 
The next question is whether there is anything 
about the nature of comparative negligence itself which 
suggests that we should deviate abruptly from the prior 
practice in this State and deprive the trial courts of the 
14 
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discretion they have heretofore enjoyed. Professor 
Thode, in his excellent article on comparative negligence 
(1973 Utah Law Review 406, 414) asserts that section 
38 of the Utah Law on Comparative Negligence (which 
is virtually identical to the Idaho Statute) does not 
require this result. He notes in this respect: 
Attempting to fit the statutory language into 
the choices under Rule 49,1 find the only sensible 
construction is that the trial judge must choose a 
method of submission that directs the jury to 
answer questions concerning the amount of dam-
ages and the percentage of negligence attribut-
able to each party. The trial judge should be 
allowed to choose the special verdict or general 
verdict with interrogatories because either 
method complies with the mandate of Section 38. 
The quoted language from section 38, in my 
judgment, cannot support the construction that 
upon demand all issues must be decided upon 
the basis of a special verdict submission to the 
jury. 
Even more so in the instant case, any mandate in the 
Idaho statute which could arguably be construed as 
requiring the blindfolding of the jury is clearly not con-
trolling in view of the fact that such would be a "pro-
cedural" rather than a "substantive" provision and 
therefore not applicable in the courts of Utah under the 
choice of law doctrines discussed herein. 
As further support for the proposition that there 
is nothing about comparative negligence itself which 
requires "blindfolding" the jury, we refer this Court to 
15 
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the numerous cases which have heretofore been decided 
under F E L A . I t apparently has never occurred to 
anyone in this State that there is anything wrong with 
telling a jury what it was doing in a F E L A compara-
tive negligence case. See, for example, JIFU instruc-
tions 81.1 and 81.3 which clearly advise the jury the 
effect of its findings in a F E L A case. See also Ben-
nett v. Denver <% Rio Grande Western Railway Com-
pany, 117 Utah 57, 213 P.2d 325, 332 (1950) wherein 
Justice Wolfe, concurring, quite frankly acknowledged 
that the jury may tend to average out the various fac-
tors in order to arrive at a just verdict. 
I t is quite likely that the jury looks at these 
cases realistically by determining what net 
amount the plaintiff should receive to see him 
decently through life and then makes the verdict 
high enough so that its guess as to the amount 
the plaintiff should be penalized for contributory 
negligence when subtracted will bring the verdict 
to the amount that they think he should receive. 
Justice Wolfe expressed no shock or dismay at this 
concept. I t would appear to be an erratic and discrim-
inatory policy to fully advise a jury of the law in 
F E L A "complete" comparative negligence cases but to 
isolate them from that knowledge in "51-49" compara-
tive negligence cases. 
There are two basic facets to the question which 
ought to be considered. First, on a philosophical level 
one must decide whether the jury is to be entrusted 
with knowledge of what it is doing or whether it should 
16 
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be scrupulously circumscribed and isolated. Certainly 
reasonable minds can differ on this subject. 
Professor Wigmore, Ezra Pound and Professor 
Moore have all written on this subject and have each 
advocated the "general verdict" approach.4 Moore 
(5A Moore's Federal Practice, §49.07 at 2235-36) puts 
it as follows: 
The jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific 
fact finding body. Its chief value is that it ap-
plies the "law," oftentimes a body of technical 
and refined theoretical principles and sometimes 
edged with harshness, in an earthy fashion that 
comports with "justice" as conceived by the 
masses, for whom after all the law is mainly 
meant to serve. The general verdict is the answer 
from the man in the street. 
On the polar side of this philosophical issue perhaps the 
most quoted spokesmen are Carroll R. Heft and C. 
James Heft who in Heft, Comparative Negligence 
Manual, Section 8.10 (1971) state as follows: 
The special verdict is the very cornerstone of the 
comparative negligence concept, and the jury 
does not, and should not, know the legal effect 
and result of its answers to the interrogatories 
on the special verdict. 
By using the procedure of a special verdict under 
comparative negligence, a jury finds the facts 
without regard to the ultimate outcome of the 
case. The court takes the facts as found by the 
jury and awards judgment. The procedure is 
4 Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 Am. 
Jud. Soc'y. 166 (1929); and Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910). 
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intended to ascertain the truth untainted by 
prejudice or a desire to see one of the parties 
win or lose. 
I t probably ought to be observed, in fairness, that the 
Hefts represent approximately twenty five insurance 
companies ranging from The American Family In-
surance Company to Western Casualty & Surety Com-
pany. (See 197 Martindale-Hubbell Law Dictionary, 
Vol. IV, p. 3004B.) 
In determining which approach is desirable, this 
court might well consider whether there is any empir-
ical support in Utah for the proposition that juries are 
no longer worthy of the trust we have traditionally 
placed in them. Has Utah experienced run-away plain-
tiff's verdicts? Have juries acted lawlessly in granting 
verdicts to plaintiffs solely out of compassion? Do 
juries disregard the trial court's instructions on the 
law? We submit that this court is in an excellent posi-
tion to evaluate the effectiveness of judge-jury func-
ioning in Utah and to determine if there is any truly 
compelling reason now, for the first time, to significant-
ly diminish the relative role of the jury in this state. 
Aside from the purely philosophical considerations, 
there are, of course, numerous pragmatic considerations 
which this Court should consider: 
How long can you keep juries blindfolded? I t 
would seem that sooner or later people are going to find 
out what the law of comparative negligence is and, 
when they are asked to serve upon juries, they will 
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apply that knowledge. The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals, in deciding that the jury should be advised of 
the affect of their findings upon the verdict noted: 
The manner in which the law applies to a given 
state of facts should not be a closely guarded 
secret which is known only to judges and law-
yers. I t will, in fact, ultimately become known 
to at least some members of the community who 
will be asked to sit upon juries. I t is far better 
for courts to be the vehicle by which the opera-
tion of the law is explained than to rely upon 
whatever chance understanding may come the 
way of potential jurors. Simpson v. Anderson, 
517 P.2d 416, 419 (Colo. App. 1973). 
The possibility of affirmative injustice. The prin-
cipal problem of not advising the jury as to the law 
of comparative negligence is that it is quite likely the 
jury will come to conclusions or assumptions which may 
be affirmatively misleading. They may assume that the 
plaintiff will recover but the damages will be reduced 
proportionally (as in F E L A cases). They may assume 
that in a fifty-fifty case, the plaintiff will recover fifty 
percent, (which because of certain abuses with the 51-
49 type of statute, Wisconsin has now adopted as a 
measure of recovery) or they might assume any number 
of other possibilities. This problem has bothered vari-
ous commentators on this subject. The Court of Ap-
peals in Colorado noted in this respect: 
A realistic approach requires that we recognize 
the jury's will to anticipate the consequence of 
their findings relative to percentage of neglig-
ence. 
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Under the Colorado Comparative Negligence 
provision, which denies recovery to the plaintiff 
found 50% negligent, there is a substantial possi-
bility that a jury might misunderstand the con-
sequences of its decision. Acknowledging that 
jurors will anticipate the effect of their findings, 
we believe it preferable for the jury to deliberate 
with an understanding of the true effect of the 
law rather than under possible misapprehensions. 
Id. at 418. 
Professor Thode shares this concern: 
An instruction on the law of comparative neglig-
ence is especially needed because the absence of 
such instruction may be affirmatively mislead-
ing. Absent such an instruction, a sensible juror 
is likely to believe that the plaintiff will recover, 
but that the damages will be reduced proportion-
ally if plaintiff's contributory negligence is found 
to be less than one hundred percent. Such an 
assumption would be accurate in a "pure" com-
parative negligence state, but not in Utah where 
the plaintiff's negligence must be less than the 
defendant's negligence for plaintiff to recover 
anything from that defendant. Thode, supra, at 
417-418. 
Inconsequentiality. Another problem which we be-
lieve is serious is that if the jury is not advised of the 
consequences and impact of their answers to the inter-
rogatories, they may well assume that the questions are 
insignificant or unimportant. One author (William J . 
Flynn in "Comparative Negligence: Debate," Trial 
Magazine, 49, 51, May-June 1972) notes in this respect: 
The percentage inquiry in a special question, 
when posed without explanation, sounds incon-
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sequential and nonprobative unless the j u r y is 
told how it does or does not result in a verdict, 
and unless the j u ry is required to work out the 
end-verdict in dollars themselves. 
Juror Frustration. Another highly important con-
sideration is that service as a juror is, for many people, 
their only exposure to the judicial system. W e submit 
that the performance of that duty will be frustrating 
and promotive of distrust if the jurors are not trusted 
with the consequences of their decisions. They should 
know how a case comes out and not be required to re-
sort to guess. The public, including jurors , is legally 
presumed to know the law. I t certainly seems, there-
fore, that we should not attempt to hide it from them. 
W e recognize that there will undoubtedly be cases 
where it will be almost impossible to advise the j u ry of 
the affect of their findings, particularly in complex, 
multi-party litigation involving claims for indemnity, 
contribution, counterclaims, etc. I n such cases, as has 
been historically the case in this jurisdiction, the trial 
judge should continue to have discretion to utilize the 
form of verdict which will best produre a jus t result. 
If that form of verdict happens to be a special verdict, 
certainly the trial court should have that discretion. On 
the other hand, we respectfully submit that the trial 
court's discretion ought not to be circumscribed against 
using interrogatories with a general verdict in com-
parative negligence cases. I n the instant case, after 
living with the case, observing the results, and hearing 
all relevant arguments, Judge Snow determined that 
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the jury should have been told the affect of their find-
ings and that the failure to do so resulted in a sub-
stantial injustice. 
In conclusion, we commend the following discus-
sion of this subject to the Court. I t represents the 
views of two University of Texas law professors which 
we think fairly summarize our position. 
Why indeed should juries be denied the under-
standing of how their answers will affect the out-
come of the case? Further, how successful are 
the efforts of the judges to control the juror's 
answers in favor of the party the juror thinks 
should win? How can an intelligent person who 
listens to what goes on in the courtroom go to 
the jury room without having an opinion that 
one of the parties should have his verdict? And 
if he has a conviction, what can keep him from 
voting his conviction whether he keeps quiet or 
becomes an advocate for the answer he thinks will 
support the judgment he desires? To ask him to 
find the facts is to ask him to consider the out-
come to which the facts contribute. There is no 
such thing as findings facts in a vacuum—they 
have meaning only when found with respect to 
some objective. Since the juror cannot be kept 
from considering the effect of his answer, why 
should the attempt be made ? 
We think that jury trial necessarily is based on 
the assumption that a jury is entitled to have 
all the aid the court can give in understanding 
the law relevant to the controlling issues as they 
are submitted. Any attempt to "hide the ball" 
is beneath the dignity of a court and is a challenge 
to the integrity of trial by jury. If the case is 
tried before a judge sitting also as a jury, he 
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has the benefit of the evidence and the law and 
makes such findings supported by the evidence 
as he conisders necessary to support the judg-
ment he renders for one party or the other. In 
all fairness to the parties and the jury, why 
should the jury not have the benefit of all the 
law and the relevant facts that a judge would 
have in trying the case without a jury? The 
only answer is fear of the jury. 
Denying instructions to guide the jury in the 
performance of its functions because of fear that 
it may reach a judgment based on the layman's 
sense of justice can hardly be called jury trial. 
Green & Smith, Negligence, Law, No-Fault, 
and Jury Trial—I, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1093, 1113-
15 (1972). 
B. 
In the event this court should rule that the jury 
should not be advised as to the effect of its findings on 
comparative negligence, the new trial should nonethe-
less be allowed in order to give a more appropriate in-
struction to the jury explaining the lack of relationship 
between percentages of relative fault and damages. 
As noted above, the trial court granted a new trial 
on two grounds alternative in nature. First, the court 
held that the jury should be advised on the law of 
comparative negligence (R. 16). Secondly, pursuant 
to a request in the motion for new trial and argument, 
the court ruled alternatively as follows: 
Alternatively, and in all events, the Court is of 
the opinion that substantial justice has not been 
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done in the present case. The jurors were not 
sufficiently instructed as to the relationship, or 
lack of relationship, between the percentage find-
ings and the damages. Therefore, even if the 
jury is not told the legal meaning of the per-
centages, it should be more specifically instructed 
on how to answer the interrogatories. The jury 
should be advised and instructed specifically that 
there is no relationship between the damage 
answer and the percentages. (R. 16) 
This issue was not treated by the Appellant in its 
brief, but it is certainly deserving of consideration by 
this Court. If Utah is going to adopt the procedure of 
not advising the jury of the affect of their percentage 
answer, we must, as the corallary to that practice, adopt 
what procedures and instructions are possible to mini-
mize the possibility of the jury making unwarranted 
assumptions. The only effort made by Judge Snow to 
accomplish this in instructions submitted to the jury 
in the instant case was contained in Question No. 4 
of the Special Verdict. After asking about negligence, 
and the percentages, question No. 4 asks about damages 
as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 4. Disregarding any of the 
previous answers, what is the total amount of 
damages sustained by plaintiff F . William Mc-
Ginn I I as a result of the incident? 
(a) General damages including lost 
wages $ 
(b) Special damages $18,150.00 
TOTAL $ 
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The question is whether the first phrase, "disregarding 
any of the previous answers", is sufficient to advise the 
j u r y that there is to be no reduction iii damages based 
upon the possible fault of the plaintiff; that the plain-
tiff may or may not be entitled to damages, even though 
they are set forth by the ju ry , and that, in effect, they 
should consider the damage question in the abstract. 
I n arguing the new trial motion, plaintiff's counsel 
suggested that an instruction comparable to that given 
in Wisconsin should be given in the event that the 
court determined the j u r y should not be advised of the 
affect of its answers to the damage interrogatories. A 
proposed insruction was tendered to the Court (R. 930). 
Tha t instruction is set forth, in total, in a bulletin en-
titled Comparative Negligence Institute, dated Decem-
ber 14, 1973, sponsored by the Utah State Bar Con-
tinuing Legal Education Committee, at page 67. I t is 
a form instruction given in Wisconsin where the j u ry 
is not advised of the effect of its answers to percentage 
questions. The critical portions of that instruction as 
they relate to the damage issue are as follows: 
You must answer the damage question no matter 
how you have answered any of the previous ques-
tions in the verdict. By asking you to determine 
the amount of damages, the Court is not indicat-
ing, nor is it asking you to indicate that the 
par ty whose damages are being determined is 
entitled to them. 
I n answering the damage question, you will dis-
regard any percentages you may find or state in 
answer to the comparative negligence question: 
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any use or application of such percentages will 
be for the Court to determine in directing judg-
ment. 
* * * 
Nothing should be added by way of punishment 
or because of sympathy or resentement [sic], 
nor should anything be deducted by reason of 
doubt of the liability of any of the defendants, 
. . .
5 
The value of such an instruction is apparent. If 
the jury is not to be told what the percentages mean, 
they may be under the mistaken belief that the plain-
tiff will receive something inasmuch as the jury is 
asked to determine what the damages are. If Utah is 
going to "blindfold the jury" there are at least two 
different ways to obviate this problem. The first, which 
is not as satisfactory as informing the jury about the 
law, is to give them a precautionary instruction such 
as that set forth above. A second, and perhaps prefer-
able if more cumbersome method, would be to have a 
bifurcated submission whereby the jury would first de-
termine the answer to the liability question and then, 
only if necessary, retire to the jury room a second time 
in order to determine the question of damages. 
This phenomenon has not escaped literary com-
ment. In Comparative Negligence: The Debate, Trial 
Magazine, (May-June 1972), the author, William J . 
Flynn, notes that one of the problems with not advising 
the jury is: 
5 Heft and Heft also recommend this instruction — Comparative 
Negligence Manual, Section 7.550 (1970). 
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An illusion is cultivated among the juiy that the 
plaintiff is to be awarded something, merely be-
cause they have been instructed by the judge to 
work out a damage evaluation—which means ex-
tended discussion in the jury, deliberation room 
of physicians' testimony, future incapacitation, 
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of living, 
detailed medical special damages, loss of earn-
ings past and future, and auto property damage. 
Hours may thus be devoted by the jury to wrest-
ling with these damage issues in the jury deliber-
ation room, particularly where there was con-
flicting medical testimony or where the jury 
members hold different views as to the extent 
of damages. 
This is a deceptive state of affairs calculated to 
create miscarriage of justice. Id. at 50. 
No matter how this Court decides the first issue 
presented in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted 
that it is critical this issue be decided in a way consistent 
with Judge Snow's ruling on the motion for new trial. 
There is a clear danger that the jury was uninformed 
in this respect which may haw -iflVctcd their answers 
to the percentage questions. If we are going to adopt 
the "blindfolded" approach utilized in Wisconsin, we 
should, as a necessary corollary adopt instructions de-
veloped over many years in Wisconsin including, spec-
ifically, "thai \- i-i"l Judge Snow found should have been 
granted regarding the lack of relationship between the 
percentages of fault and damages. 
Thus, the order granting a new trial should be 
sustained regardless of how the court answers the first 
question presented on appeal. 
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POINT I I 
CROSS-APPEAL BY RESPONDENT 
T H E T R I A L COURT C O M M U T E D P R E -
J U D I C I A L E R R O R I N T H E COURSE O F 
T H E T R I A L I N R E F U S I N G TO A D M I T 
C E R T A I N P H O T O G R A P H S . 
Regardless of how this Court rules on the other 
issues presented in this appeal, plaintiff nonetheless 
submits that error was committed by the trial court in 
excluding certain photographs from evidence and there-
fore that he is entitled to a new trial. 
The exhibits in question are Exhibits 66p, 67p and 
68p. Each of these is a photograph of the area in which 
the accident occurred showing warning signs which were 
placed on the beach subsequent to the accident in 
question. 
These pictures were offered in connection with the 
testimony of a witness from Utah Power & Light Com-
pany, Mr. Daniel James Raymond, District Repre-
sentative of the Montpelier, Idaho District which in-
cludes the subject area. Mr. Raymond testified that 
he was familiar with warning signs such as that ad-
mitted as exhibit 58p (R. 794). He further admitted 
that those signs have been available for many years in 
the Montpelier district, (Ibid). Mr. Raymond was 
asked regarding the use of these signs in recreational 
areas as follows: 
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Q. As of J uly 1972 there was no particular rea-
son why the signs could not have been placed on 
that beach area west of Lifton, was there? 
A, This did not pertain at all to the, anything 
except for irrigation areas, these signs. 
Q. Now I don't T am not sure I quite catch 
that distinction. 
A. This sign there, it says, I believe it says, keep 
the pipe horizontal. I t is strictly for an irriga-
tion pipe that it shows in the picture. And it's 
meant, I think, strictly for an irrigation area, 
the sign. The bottom of the sign says, keep the 
pipe horizontal. 
Q. I see, and tha I: • :: i i l / \ refers to irriga tion 
pipes ? 
::\ That is what these were piil on! *or,--vs. 
Q. I see. Any other kind of pipe, you happen to 
have that kind of pipe, you are jus t not protected 
by this sign, is that your policy? 
A, These were sent out with the information that 
they should be put around irrigation systems. 
(R. 795-796.) 
Based upon this testimony, plaintiff offered ex-
hibits 66p through 68p for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing that signs, (identical to 58p) , could feasibly and 
practicably be utilized for warning purposes in recrea-
tion areas. The jarv was excused from the 1*001 n and 
if- if-: of j •< - ! :•; id' vi l l i respect to these photos, 
(R. 797). Plaintiff requested the photograph- be ad-
mitted with a 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[C]autionary instruction that they are not to be 
considered as evidence of negligence of the defen-
dant, but are offered for two purposes: Number 
1, to show the practicality and ease with which 
the signs could have been put up; Number 2, on 
a question of impeachment of testimony of the 
gentleman we just had on the stand. His testi-
mony was that these signs were used only for 
irrigation purposes. That is what they are for, 
and so forth, and so on. This [referring to the 
photographs] is evidence that they've been used 
for recreational purposes and are just as good 
for that as they are for irrigation. And thirdly, 
we offer them on the trespass issue. (R. 797-
798.) 
There was extensive argument on this subject, (R. 700 
et seq), briefs were submitted, (R. 222 et seq), and the 
court ultimately excluded evidence of defendant's sub-
sequent sign posting on the beach area in question (R. 
815). 
The admission of these photographs should be con-
trolled by Utah's newly adopted Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 51 thereof provides as follows: 
When after the occurrence of an event remedial 
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if 
taken previously would have tended to make the 
event less likely to occur, evidence of such sub-
sequent measures is not admissible to prove neg-
ligence or culpable conduct in connection with 
the event. 
N O T E : This rule relates only to negligence and 
not to causation. I t is not intended to exclude 
evidence which might be admissible on other 
grounds independent of such provisions. 
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This rule of evidence restates wha; has been recognized 
by most courts as being the law of this subject. Sec 
generally Annotation: Admissibility of evidence of re-
pairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken a Her 
the accident, 64 A T E. 2d 1298. 
In a number of eases, remedial measures in con-
nection with electrocution incidents have been held ad-
missible under a number of the exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. In Cooper v. Heintz Manufacturing Com-
pany, 385 Pa. 296, 122 A.2d 699 (1956), evidence re-
garding a guard placed at a transformer tower follow-
ing an electrocution incident was held admissible I'nr 
the purpose of designating control over the instrumen-
ality. To the same general effect see Houston Light-
ing <$ Power v. Tabor, 221 S.W. 2d 339 (Texas 1949). 
In Johnson v. United States, 163 F . Supp. 388 (D.C. 
Montana 1958), repairs to an electrical substation 
barbed wire were held admissible "for the sole purpose 
of showing the practicality of this additional safeguard." 
Id. at 395. And in Hyadman v. Pennsylvania Railway 
Company, 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251, it was held that 
warning signs, placed after an injury on a transformer 
tower, were admissible on the question of whether it 
was practical for the defendant to take steps to further 
guard the area. 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant 
Power Company, having taken the position tha warn-
ing signs, such as exhibit 58p, were used "strictly' for 
irrigation purposes, placed in issue the question of the 
practicality of I itilizing such signs in other areas includ-
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ing the beach in question. Having placed the question 
in issue, the Power Company should be estopped from 
objecting to the admissibility of subsequent signs. 
These signs do demonstrate that it was practicable, 
feasible and perhaps effective to place warning signs 
along the beach in question in such a way as to fairly 
advise the visiting public of hidden dangers above. 
I t is further submitted that the error in excluding 
these photographs was prejudicial to plaintiff. Had 
the jury been advised as to the practicality and feasi-
bility of placing these signs in a recreation area and 
had they not been led to believe that the signs were 
"strictly" for irrigation purposes, they may well have 
assessed a greater amount of negligence to the defend-
ant and a lesser amount to the plaintiff. 
POINT III 
T H E COURT E R R E D IN U N R E A S O N -
A B L Y R E S T R I C T I N G T H E A R E A OF P E R -
M I S S I B L E CLOSING A R G U M E N T ON P E R -
C E N T A G E S . 
If this Court should rule that the jury may be 
advised of the affect of its percentage findings, there 
is no need to consider this point. On the other hand, 
if the court should rule that the Wisconsin practice of 
blindfolding the jury is to be followed, then the Court 
should consider this additional point since it does raise 
an issue as to the proper scope of argument. 
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The practice in W isconsin has been that, although 
a jury is not advised as to the affect of its percentage 
findings, counsel have been allowed to argue various 
percentages without advising the jury as to what the 
legal affect will be. 
Apparently one trick that defense lawyers in Wis-
consin have used is to argue that the parties are fifty-
fifty responsible. This is recommended by Heft & Heft 
in Comparative Negligence Manual, Section 6.50 as 
follows: 
The argument that both parties are equally at 
fault is very effective in a close case. It compels 
the plaintiff to "reach" and argue that the plain-
tiff is either not at fai lit at all, or is at fault in 
a lesser degree. 
Apparently, defense lawyers have utilized this tech-
nique extensively in Wisconsin, to such an extent that 
Wisconsin finally amended its statute to provide that 
the plaintiff recovers even though his negligence is fifty 
percent. See Thode, supra., 406, 418 N. 41. 
In the trial of this case Judge Snow, while pre-
venting the parties informing the jury of the effect of 
their findings, went further and stated that the parties 
could not argue the percentages. The colloquy on this 
subject commences at R, S"?n. Tin* tri:il jtidjfe finally 
advised as follows: 
I think each party can argue within legal bounds 
that their own client is either not negligent at 
all or very, very slight and that the other party 
was grossly negligent or almost the only negli-
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gence, but no mention of the fact that the money 
award depends on the degree. See what I mean? 
Even like a ten-ninety or anything else. Stay 
away from anything like that, and especially 
don't even get near that fifty-fifty thing. (R. 
817). 
Although we do not commend the practice of the Wis-
consin defense lawyers exploiting this type of argu-
ment, we do believe that if the jury is not to be in-
structed as to what the percentages mean, at bare mini-
mum counsel ought to be allowed to fully argue various 
percentages. In other words, we should not simply 
adopt part of the Wisconsin rules and not others. I t 
is extremely difficult to argue a case like this by using 
words such as "great" or "small." Counsel should be 
allowed to argue specific percentages including fifty 
one-forty nine or fifty-fifty, or any other figures. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the failure to 
allow that type of argument consitutes reversible error, 
in the event this court should ultimately decide the jury 
should be blindfolded. 
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CON CI i C J SION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Judge Snow did 
not abuse his inherent discretion in granting the new 
trial in this proceeding. To a considerable degree, this 
trial was an experimental one inasmuch as Judge Snow 
was required to n ile i ipon v arioi is issues of first im-
pression in this jurisdiction. Although his rulings were 
considered and studied, we respectfully submit that his 
final conclusion, that is that justice was not done, is well 
supported and that a new trial should be granted. Before 
that new trial is held, however, the rulings of this Court 
are needed on critical issues: (1) Should the jury be 
"blindfolded"—as to this matter we respectfully submit 
that ]\r tradition V Vluh entrusting oir juries with 
knowledge of the consequences of their action should 
be continued; (2) Should more precise instructions be 
given in the event the juries are "blindfolded"—as to 
this issue we submit that Judge Snow's ruling on the 
new trial motion is correct and that juries should be 
given more careful instructions "than were provided In 
the instant case to prevent injustice even f 'h- j<ir\ is 
to I>e "blindfolded"; (3) On the evidentiary issue, v\ o 
respectfully submit that in a close case (and this was 
close) a ruling such as that questioned in point 2 of this 
brief could well be prejudicial and therefore, the Court's 
error in that respect should be, independently, ground 
for a new trial J : I) Finally, the Court erred pre-
judicially us unduU restricting argument >>n percent-
ages VJU] hence increased Hie confusion ^ the /jury 
which, itself, is independent grounds for a new trial. 
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It is respectfully submitted that a new trial be 
ordered by the Court with the guidance of this Court on 
the issues presented. 
Dated this 6th day of September, 1974. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
By JAMES B . L E E 
D. FRANK WILKINS and 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent-Cross Appellant 
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